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Abstract 
In 2015, Nigeria held one of the most fiercely contested presidential elections in the.  In 
2015, Nigeria held one of the most fiercely contested presidential elections in the nation’s recent 
democratic history. The outcome of the election was expected to exert significant influence on 
democratic practices on the African continent. The stiffness of the contest also meant that it was 
difficult to predict the likely winner of the election. This paper summarizes how an empirical 
approach was used to forecast the outcome of the election by modeling public sentiment data-
set using a geodemographic framework. Results indicate that the main electorates that 
determined the outcome of the election were situated in thirteen battleground states. 
Additionally, results showed that two years before the presidential election, Goodluck 
Jonathan’s public approval ratings on corruption, insecurity, and the economy (the main drivers 
of the 2015 election) had nose-dived across many of the battleground states. This eventually 
contributed toward his loss.  
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Although there were irregularities during the Nigerian 2011 presidential election 
(Uduma and Emerole 2015), it was generally considered credible when compared to 
some previous elections. Goodluck Jonathan, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) 
candidate, benefitted from the public sympathetic support and a weak opposition which 
ensured he won the election (Adibe 2015). Over 5 in 10 electorates voted for the PDP in 
2011 (Lunn and Harari 2014). The other two main contenders were Muhammadu 
Buhari of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) and Nuhu Ribadu of the Action 
Congress of Nigeria (ACN). Just over 3 in 10 voters supported Buhari whilst Ribadu 
received approximately 1 in 10 votes (Lunn and Harari 2014).  Other political parties 
including the All Nigeria’s Peoples Party (ANPP) shared the rest of the votes. 
 
In February 2013, the All Progressives Congress (APC) was formed following 
the merger of three core opposition parties – the ACN, the CPC and the ANPP (BBC 
2013). A faction of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) also joined the 
alliance (Premium Times 2013). 
 
The 2015 presidential election was contested between Goodluck Jonathan of the 
PDP and Muhammadu Buhari of the APC. Many of independent polls examined voting 
intentions at geo-political (6 regions) and national scales even though there was a sense 
that the contest would be stiff in selected states. Better understanding was required at a 
more granular geographical scale. There are 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs) in 
Nigeria (Ojo et al. 2012). However, the Nigerian Independent National Electoral 
Commission (INEC) hardly releases electoral statistics at the LGA scale and this makes 
it difficult for researchers to attempt local level analysis and forecasts of democratic 
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processes. Most studies restrict their analysis to the six geo-political regions or at best 
the 37 territories that make up states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). To the 
best of our knowledge, no recent national study has successfully profiled critical 
dimensions of Nigeria’s electoral geography at the LGA scale. 
  
The remainder of this article summarises the profiling of Nigeria’s electoral 
dynamics prior to the 2015 presidential election. The article also explains how the 
outcome of the election was predicted using insights from secondary data modelling. 
The article starts by delineating those battleground states where the 2015 election was 
expected to be fought, won or lost. Next, the implication of multiple registrations during 
elections is reviewed. This is followed by a discussion on the geography of change in 
the number of registered voters between 2011 and 2015. This article also examines 
spatial patterns of voter apathy and discusses the geographical distribution of undecided 
or floating voters prior to the 2015 presidential election. The focus of the article then 
shifts towards the political temperature within and between battleground states midway 
into Goodluck Jonathan’s tenure in office. The article concludes by evaluating the 
probabilities that adults in the battleground states were prepared to vote against former 
president Goodluck Jonathan.  
Data and Methods 
Until the 2015 general election, mainstream political parties in Nigeria did not 
consider using differential strategic and operational target marketing during their 
campaign processes (Ibekwe 2015). However, following the emergence of a formidable 
opposition (the APC) and an increasingly enlightened body of electorates, political 
parties now recognise the need to proficiently decode the expectations of electorates, 
match their manifestos to these expectations and effectively communicate their plans in 
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an appealing manner (Said-Moorhouse 2015; Bartlett et al. 2015). To achieve these 
objectives especially in battleground states where the race can be tight, it is essential 
that a high level of local spatial awareness is adopted by political parties (Carty and 
Eagles 1999). 
Two large secondary datasets underpin the discussion in this paper. The first 
dataset is a multi-criteria hierarchical geodemographic classification system developed 
for all LGAs in Nigeria. The Nigerian LGA Geodemographic Classification System 
(NIGECS) is an area classification that simplifies a large and complex body of 
information about people, where and how they live (including their lifestyles) and work 
(Ojo et al. 2012). The methodology used to develop NIGECS is underpinned by 
geographical theories that people with similar characteristics are more likely to live 
within the same locality and that such locality types will be distributed in different 
locations across geographical space (Tobler 1970; Vickers and Rees 2006; Ojo et al. 
2013). Table 1 illustrates the structure of the NIGECS. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Green Towns concentrate mostly in the South Western corner of Nigeria. They 
tend to be comprised of residents in older age categories with pensioners. Emerging 
Localities encapsulate 166 LGAs mainly in the North East and are characterised by 
below average population densities. Intermediate Territories can mostly be found within 
the South East whilst Diluted Societies concentrate in the North Central Area of 
Nigeria. Country Dwellings spread across the North East and North Western parts of 
Nigeria with a mean household size of 5.1 persons and an average population density of 
144 persons per square kilometre. Urban Nodes are scattered across the country and do 
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not necessarily concentrate in any geopolitical zone. However, the North East has the 
lowest share of Urban Nodes.  
 
The second dataset is a face-to-face survey conducted by a coalition of 
independent non-partisan academics and international organisations. The core project 
partners include The Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), Institute for 
Empirical Research in Political Economy (IREEP), Institute for Development Studies 
(IDS), The University of Nairobi and Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in South 
Africa (IJR). The key Nigerian partner is CLEEN Foundation while other project 
support units include Michigan State University (MSU) and the Democracy in Africa 
Research Unit (DARU), Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town. 
The Nigerian survey is part of the Afrobarometer project which seeks to feel the 
democratic pulse of several African nations (Bratton 2013). The survey data used here 
was collected in 2012. 
The first step in the analysis was the determination of battleground states. This 
was achieved by identifying those states where the PDP appeared vulnerable. We 
calculated four sets of metrics form the 2011 election results. For each political party, 
we determined: (a) those states where the votes amassed by the party equals two-thirds 
or more of all eligible voters in the state; (b) those states where the votes amassed by the 
party equals two-thirds or more of all the votes cast in the state; (c) those states where 
the votes amassed by a party are greater than half but less than two-thirds of all eligible 
voters in the state; (d) those states where the votes amassed by a party are greater than 




We evaluated the spatial and temporal changes in the distribution of eligible 
voters. This was achieved by assessing the voter’s registration data published by the 
Nigerian INEC. The share of voters registered in 2015 was compared with the share of 
voters registered in 2011 across all states. This analysis also helped to provide an initial 
glimpse of some aspects of the behaviour of electorates within the battleground states.  
 
We estimated the propensity for voters to exhibit at least five additional electoral 
traits and drivers of the 2015 election. These include: 
a. Voter apathy 
b. Swing voting 
c. Voting intention as a result of public perception on corruption 
d. Voting intention as a result of public perception on insecurity 
e. Voting intention as a result of public perception on the state of the economy 
Propensity measures were calculated using the notation given in Equation 1.  
 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 =  ��𝑃𝑃 ∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘1⁄ � ÷ �𝑁𝑁 ∑ 𝑁𝑁𝑘𝑘1⁄ �� (1) 
Where, 
𝑃𝑃 is the count of people exhibiting a particular electoral trait (e.g. may not vote in 
elections) in geodemographic typology k 
𝑁𝑁 is the count of adult population in geodemographic typology k 






The model used to calculate LGA level propensities for different electoral traits 
relates the weighted distribution of survey respondents across geodemographic 
typologies with LGA level adult populations (aged 20 years and above) used as the 
base. A propensity index were calculated for each geodemographic typology at the 
group level of the Nigerian geodemographic classification system.  A score of 100 
indicates a level of occurrence of an electoral issue equal to the national mean or 
expected level. An area with a score of 150 would indicate a level 50% above the 
national average and a score of 200 twice the expected rate (Harris et al. 2005). 
 
We gauged the propensity for voter apathy by calculating the likelihood that 
voters would abstain from elections. Crewe et al. (1992) provided a definition for voter 
apathy. According to them, apathy symbolises a lack of feeling of personal 
responsibility and indifference for political affairs. A typical apathetic voter does not 
consider the need to participate in participate in electoral proceedings as a priority 
(Crewe et al. 1992; INEC and FES 2011). There is no universal measure for apathetic 
voter. For this study, three variables from the Afrobarometer study were combined to 
gauge voter apathy. These variables include 
a. Those respondents that did not register to vote 
b. Those respondents that registered and decided not to vote 
c. Those respondents that indicated that they did not have the time to vote. 
 
The second trait that was modelled is the propensity for voters to swing in the 
direction of any political party. Mayer (2007) defined a swing voter as an individual 
“who is not solidly committed to one candidate or the other as to make all efforts of 
persuasion futile” (Mayer, 2007 p. 359). Weghorst and Lindberg (2013) further 
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explained the factors that determine the decision-making protocol of African swing 
voters. Using empirical evidence from Ghana, they challenged the notion that African 
electorates tend to vote on the basis of ethnic cleavages and clientelistic networks. They 
discovered that the performance of incumbent politicians is an important driver of how 
swing voters behave in Africa.  
 
There is no consensus in the literature about how to measure swing voting. 
Measures that have been used include self-reported ambivalence (Hoffman et al. 2009), 
lack of party affiliation (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987) and past voting behaviour (Shaw 
2008). For this study, lack of party affiliation was used. The Afrobarometer study asked 
respondents to specify the political party they would support in a presidential election. 
Those respondents who indicated that they would vote for the candidate and not a 
specific political party were identified as swing voters. 
 
From the Afrobarometer survey, we also modelled the propensity to vote against 
the incumbent president on the basis of three main drivers of the 2015 election 
(corruption, insecurity and the economy). We created a contingency table of those 
respondents who indicated that they would not vote for Goodluck Jonathan by the three 
reasons given for their disaffection with the Jonathan administration.    
 
In addition to estimating the propensity indices, we calculated the probabilities 
of voting against the incumbent president (Goodluck Jonathan) by initially deriving the 
odds of voting against him. The odds were converted to probabilities in the thirteen 
battleground states identified. The probabilities simply express the chance of voting 
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against Goodluck Jonathan as a ratio of the number of desired outcomes (adults who 
were not prepared to vote for the ruling party) to the total number of possible outcomes. 
Battleground States 
Section 133 (b) of the Nigerian 1999 constitution makes it clear that the winner 
of any presidential contest needs to win at least two-thirds of all the states in the 
federation and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja (World Intellectual Property 
Organization 2016). In principle, the winner needs to dominate at least 24 of the 37 
administrative territories (36 states and 1 FCT). 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
To delineate the battleground states ahead of the 2015 election, it was instructive 
to re-visit voting dynamics in 2011. Figure 1 shows the thresholds of majority held by 
each party in 2011. The map was produced by analysing the share of votes cast for each 
party in each state and examining the relationship between votes cast and eligible 
voters. The APC was not in existence during the 2011 election. Therefore, in order to 
determine the majority thresholds for the APC, we combined the share of votes that 
accrued to the ACN, CPC and ANPP in that election. The votes cast for APGA were not 
included. They were considered negligible since only a faction of APGA merged with 
the other three parties (Thurston 2015). In 2011, the PDP won all states with a shade of 
red while the APC dominated in states with a shade of blue. 
 
From the analysis, it is evident that Osun State was the epicentre of the APC in 
the South West geo-political region and that the key targets of the APC were situated 




There are two categories of battleground states. The first group are 8 states 
where the PDP recorded greater than half but less than two-thirds of votes cast in the 
corresponding state. These are states where the PDP appeared to be most vulnerable and 
they include Ogun, Oyo, Ekiti, Kwara, Abuja FCT, Nasarawa, Taraba and Adamawa 
States. 
 
The second group of battleground states are a selection of 5 states where the 
PDP two-thirds or more of all the votes cast in the corresponding state. These states are 
also listed with the most vulnerable first. They include Lagos, Benue, Kogi, Plateau, 
and Ondo States. 
 
In Figure 2, we show the rates at which registered electorates turned out to vote 
during the 2011 election. In a two-horse race as was the case in the 2015 election, voter 
turn-out can be crucial in deciding the direction in which a fiercely contested territory 
ultimately swings. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
The analysis reveals that turn-out was particularly low in all the South West 
states indicating substantial concentration in this region, of electorates who were 
disaffected with democratic governance and the electoral process during the 2011 
election. Turnout was also low in Kwara and Sokoto States. Interestingly, engagement 
with the electoral process seems to have been greater within key PDP strongholds than 
in the APC strongholds. In summary, all the 13 battleground states appear to exhibit 
significant levels of disaffection with the electoral process. 
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Multiple Registrations and Space-time Change in Eligible Voters 
In 2011, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) announced 
that close to 74 million adults registered to vote in the presidential election (Iheduru 
2014). However, the true figure was slightly over 70 million people (Ibeanu et al. 2010; 
Voa 2011). Following the 2011 presidential election, INEC consolidated and optimised 
the national voters register in order to eliminate multiple registrations (INEC 2011). 
About 4 million duplicate registrations were detected (Nwafor 2015; Sule 2015). 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Figure 3 shows the rates at which multiple registrations was detected. The 
national average rate for multiple registrations was 5.7%. Rates varied from as low as 
o.2% to 14%. Duplicate registration was particularly pervasive in 17 states listed in 
Table 2. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Amongst the 17 states fingered for higher than average duplicate registrations in 
2011, the PDP dominated in 11 whilst APC (comprising the three surrogate parties) 
won 6 states. A total of 20 states did not report greater than average rates. The 
calculation for the APC in 2011 was based on the combination of votes from three 
surrogate parties - ACN, CPC and ANPP. 
 
Figure 4 compares the share of voters registered in 2015 with those registered in 
2011 across all states. The numbers on each side of the pyramid sum up to 100% for 
each year. In both years, Lagos and Kano dwarf the other states. Lagos was a keenly 
contested state during the 2015 election. 
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[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Rates of registration and turnout of voters matter because most people perceive 
democratic processes to be more legitimate when participation is high (Dalton 2008; 
Lijphart 1997). It is not quite clear what accounted for such a substantial decline in the 
number of eligible voters by 2015. The significant reduction in numbers suggests that 
an increase in voter education alone may not be sufficient to reverse the strength of 
voter apathy amongst Nigerian electorates. Perhaps people may become better engaged 
when they perceive that electoral malpractices have diminished and they discover that 
their votes actually ‘count’ (Birch 2010). 
 
Scholars have argued that voter education ensures that electorates are ready, 
willing, and able to fully engage in electoral processes (Persson 2013; Hillygus 2005; 
Tenn 2007). It is presumed that effective education of voters can act as the motivating 
force for driving an agile body of electorates (INEC and FES 2011). However, just over 
68 million eligible voters registered to take part in the 2015 election (Mbachu et al. 
2015; Welsh 2015). Compared to the 2011 optimised voters register, there was a 
shortfall of around 1.5 million adults. 
 
Four states witnessed significant reductions in terms of their share of the 
universal number of voters. These include Borno (0.9 percentage points), Sokoto (0.7 
percentage points), Bauchi (0.6 percentage points) and Niger (0.5 percentage points). 
Figure 5 paints a picture of the scale of change in the number of eligible voters across 
states. 




The largest reductions in the number of eligible voters were in the northern half 
of the country. Reductions in Borno State (25%) is understandable. It is directly linked 
to the Boko Haram insurgency which was also a hot topic in the 2015 election. 
Reductions in Sokoto (24%) may be linked to the consolidation and optimisation of the 
voter’s register conducted by INEC. There was a 14% duplicate registration rate in 
Sokoto State during the 2011 presidential election. These registrants were weeded out of 
the 2015 electoral register by INEC. 
 
It is also noteworthy to mention that eligible voters fell in some battleground 
states notably Benue State (14% reduction), Adamawa State (7% reduction), Plateau 
State (4% reduction), Oyo State (3% reduction) and Abuja FCT (1% reduction). 
Battleground states that witnessed significant rises in the number of registered voters 
include Lagos State (7% rise) and Ekiti State (6% rise). Both states are located in the 
South West and were set to be contested fiercely in the 2015 election.  
Abstinence from Elections 
Voter apathy occurs when electorates become nonchalant about democracy and 
it is often caused by distrust for politicians (INEC and FES 2011). The turnout of voters 
for presidential elections has recently been diminishing in Nigeria. Nigeria witnessed a 
long period of autocratic rule under several military juntas. Following the return to 
democratic governance, just over half (52%) of registered voters participated in the 
1999 presidential election (INEC 2011). Turnout rose to around 69% in 2003 (Ntuk 
2016). However, disaffection increased noticeably amongst registered voters following 
the 2003 election. In 2007, the turnout of voters dropped to approximately 56% (IRI 
2007). A further reduction was recorded in 2011 when turnout fell to near post-military 
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junta era. The turnout for 2011 according to INEC was approximately 54% (CPPA 
2015). 
 
Halfway into former president Jonathan’s tenure, abstinence from elections had 
become more pronounced in some types of localities compared to others. Figure 6 
illustrates the levels of disaffection with the political process amongst Nigerian adults. 
Results are extrapolations of the geodemographic modelling. 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
The propensity indices can be interpreted using the classification in Table 3. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
In affluent urban localities, the predisposition to stay away from elections was 
nearly treble the national average rate. These LGAs are generally characterised by 
disproportionate representations of middle-aged populations and a substantial number of 
pensioner households. Literacy rates are generally very high within these areas with 
high secondary school completion rates. 
 
It is also interesting is that apathy is high (57% above the national mean) 
amongst adults in disadvantaged urban vicinities. These LGAs are comprised of the 
largest national representation of residents employed in public sector roles. 
 
Amongst the battleground states, residents of Lagos State LGAs have very high 
tendency to abstain from elections. Abuja FCT, Nasarawa and some pockets in Kwara, 
Oyo, Ogun and Ondo states also display high levels of apathy. 
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Distribution of Swing Voters 
A substantial number of Nigerian electorates gauge political parties in terms of 
their alignment to ethnic or religious issues (Nnabuihe et al. 2014; Adibe 2015). 
However, some electorates remain undecided until very close to the election. Such 
electorates are described as floating or undecided voters (Arcuri et al. 2008). In a two-
horse race like the 2015 election, undecided voters can be important in determining the 
how tightly-contested states swing. 
 
The data analysis revealed that approximately 2 in 10 adults were undecided 
halfway into Goodluck Jonathan’s tenure in office. Figure 7 also shows that by the 
middle of Goodluck Jonathan’s tenure, indecision amongst potential voters was 
disproportionately higher in the southern half of the country. Interestingly, states in the 
South East geo-political zone showed greater propensity to swing in any direction. This 
zone is a traditional stronghold of the former president. 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
Amongst the battleground states, adults in Lagos displayed disproportionately 
high concentration of undecided voters. This again explains why Lagos State was 
keenly contested in the 2015 election. 
 
For many of the undecided voters, the battle of making a choice is generally 
difficult because they are not convinced that the democratic process provides electorates 
with the real options that would make much difference to their lives (Luntz 2016). They 
feel that the options often presented to them hardly conform to their views and 
expectations resulting from their lived experiences. 
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The Political Temperature of Battleground States 
Traditionally, politicians use rhetorical strategies of creed and ethnicity to trick 
voters during elections in Nigeria (Nnabuihe et al. 2015; Adegbami and Uche 2015). 
Therefore, most elections have been fought on those fault-lines which divide rather than 
unite the nation. We argue that social problems like poverty and inequality, inadequate 
health-care, poor education, absence of infrastructure, crime, social disorder and 
unemployment do not self-select people on the basis of their religion or ethnic 
affiliation. This explains in part why voting based on religion or ethnicity does not yield 
the basic dividends of democracy which the average Nigerian craves for. 
 
Numerous public intellectuals and NGOs within and outside Nigeria made 
relentless effort to better educate the Nigerian voting public prior to the 2015 election 
(IRI 2015). Public awareness of key issues increased resulting in increased probing of 
leadership tenets (Jega and Hillier 2012; IRI 2015). In part, this triggered a semblance 
of an issue-based campaign in 2015. 
 
Corruption, insecurity and the state of the economy were the key drivers of the 
2015 presidential debates. So, what did the political temperature of Nigeria look like in 
battleground states midway into former President Jonathan’s tenure? Results from the 
geodemographic modelling are presented in Figures 8 to 10. 
[Figure 8 about here] 
[Figure 9 about here] 




Agbiboa (2011), Mohammed (2013), Osimen et al. (2013), Ogbewere (2015) 
and Kieghe (2016) have described the perpetuation of corruption in public service as a 
major reason for the inability of the Nigerian state to rise out of the shadows and fulfil 
its potential on the African continent and the global stage. Corruption has also been 
linked to the Boko Haram insurgency ravaging some states in the North East geo-
political zone (Agbiboa 2013a: Agbiboa 2013b). Whilst many Nigerians at the grass 
roots are fed-up of the corruption entrapment, they feel powerless about the situation. 
Indeed, the former Nigerian Finance Minister, Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala admitted in 
February 2015 that corruption persists in Nigeria because the country lacks institutions, 
systems and processes to prevent it (Onyedika 2015). 
 
Analysis of the Afrobarometer data revealed that halfway into former President 
Jonathan’s tenure, only 2% of Nigerian adults believed that the president and his inner 
caucus was not corrupt. When compared to the overall distribution of adults, adults 
within a few deprived rural LGAs exhibited the greatest likelihood (more than double 
the national average rate) to express discontentment with corruption in the presidential 
circle.  
 
There was also an expression of moderately high levels of negative sentiment 
towards Goodluck Jonathan on corruption within averagely thriving ethnically mixed 
LGAs where polygamous marriages are quite prevalent. Some LGAs with urban 
characteristics also subsumed higher than average representations of electorates who 
were discontented with corruption in central government. The map in Figure 8 suggests 
that there was generally strong discontentment on corruption in LGAs within Lagos 




The Boko Haram insurgency in the North East receives the greatest attention 
from commentators and policy makers. By the middle of Goodluck Jonathan’s tenure, 
approximately 6 in 10 adults reached the conclusion that he was quite weak on national 
security. Across the battleground states, LGAs in Lagos, Abuja FCT, Ondo and 
Nasarawa States harboured the largest concentration of adults discontented with the 
security situation. Figure 9 also shows pockets of significant discontentment in 
Adamawa and Plateau States where communal conflicts have been widespread. 
 
Under former President Jonathan’s watch, Nigeria re-calibrated (rebased) its 
gross domestic product (GDP) to include some industry sectors that were previously 
unaccounted for (Guardian 2014). The process of rebasing of Nigeria’s economy 
propelled it to the position of largest economy in Africa above South Africa. 
  
Official statistics on poverty, income inequality and unemployment in Nigeria 
can often make bleak reading especially when juxtaposed with countries that are 
presumably less wealthy. Even though Nigeria’s economy grew at an average of around 
7% since the beginning of the current millennium (Masseti 2014), this did not translate 
into improved welfare conditions and in part contributed to the new wave of social 
conflicts witnessed in various parts of the country (Anderson and Reynolds 2016). 
Economic growth in Nigeria has been far less poverty-reducing than in many other 
comparable developing nations that belong to the MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria 
and Turkey) economic cluster for instance (Durotoye 2014). Under the Jonathan 
administration, too many Nigerians felt there was a mismatch between economic 




Around 6 in 10 adults were already discontented with the way the economy was 
being managed by the time Goodluck Jonathan reached the middle of his tenure. Adults 
in deprived rural LGAs were most unlikely to be happy with the way the economy was 
being run. Figure 10 shows high levels of dissatisfaction in urban centres. Lagos and 
Abuja again harbour scores of adults who were highly likely to be unhappy with the fact 
that economic growth was not translating into improved living standards. 
 
The patterns of discontentment modelled for geodemographic segments at LGA 
scale in Figures 8 to 10 suggest two splits for the battleground states. Those 
battleground states on the left generally appear to be more discontented with the 
Jonathan administration than those on the right side. One would expect this sort of 
intelligence to inform both the strategic and operational campaign agendas of the 
political parties. Former President Jonathan faced the monumental challenge of 
preparing answers for questions about his performance especially in the areas of 
corruption, insecurity and the economy (Birrell 2015; Adibe 2015). 
The Probability of Voting against the Incumbent President 
In this section, we discuss the probability of voting against Goodluck Jonathan 
during the 2015 election in the 13 battleground states. Probabilities were computed for 
these states and compared with the tipping point. The tipping point is the point at which 
the probabilities of voting for or against the former president are equally likely (i.e. a 
probability of 50%). Results are summarised in Figure 11. 





Figure 11 gives an indication of how adults who were disgruntled about 
corruption were prepared to vote across the battleground states. The analysis revealed 
that the probability of voting the former president out of office had reached or risen 
above tipping point in 6 battleground states namely: Ogun (72%), Lagos (70%), Taraba 
(53%), Ondo (52%), Oyo (51%) and Adamawa (50%) States. Two other states – Ekiti 
(46%) and Kwara (42%) were also close to the tipping point. 
 
Results presented in Figure 11 also shows the voting probabilities for those 
adults who indicated that they were displeased with the former president’s handling of 
public safety and security. Amongst this group, the probability of voting Jonathan out of 
office had reached or risen above tipping point in 7 battleground states. The states 
include Ogun (71%), Kwara (71%), Lagos (69%), Adamawa (62%), Oyo (60%), Taraba 
(57%) and Nasarawa States (50%). Ondo and Ekiti State were also already heading 
closer to the tipping point with 45% and 41% probabilities respectively. 
 
The bar chart shown in Figure 11 also provides an indication of how adults who 
were disaffected with the management of the economy were prepared to vote. The 
probability to vote against the Goodluck Jonathan had reached or risen above tipping 
point in 6 of the battleground states. These include Ogun (74%), Lagos (69%), Taraba 
(58%), Oyo (57%), Ondo (52%) and Adamawa (51%) States. Ekiti State was also very 
close to the tipping point with 48% probability while there was a 41% chance of voting 
against the former president in Kwara State. 
  
Abuja particularly presents an interesting contrast. Even though public 
perception on these core issues was generally negative in most LGAs in Abuja as shown 
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in Figures 8 to 10, it still had not translated into a high probability of voting against the 
former president by the middle of his tenure. Amongst the battleground states, only 4 
(Ekiti State, Plateau State, Kogi State, Abuja FCT) consistently recorded low 
probabilities of voting against the president mid-way into his presidency. 
How Well Did the Empirical Forecast Perform? 
The empirical forecast discussed in this paper revealed that by the middle of 
Goodluck Jonathan’s tenure, his public approval ratings had plummeted across the 
entire country. The average probability of voting against him across all the states and 
FCT had already risen above the tipping point of 50%. There was a 53% chance that 
Nigerian adults who perceive the presidency as institutionally corrupt would vote 
against the former president. For those adults unhappy with the handling of security 
matters, their probability of voting against Goodluck Jonathan was 56% whilst those 
who disclosed that they were unhappy with the handling of the economy recorded a 
55% chance of voting against the president. 
 
Results from our forecast are consistent with the final outcome of the 2015 
presidential election. The election results were close. Muhammadu Buhari of the APC 
amassed 53.96% of the total votes whilst Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP recorded 
44.96%. 
 
The Nigerian INEC has not released the breakdown of detailed results at the 
LGA scale so it impossible to evaluate our LGA forecasts against the actual outcome. 
However, state level results have been published therefore we compare our state level 




[Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 4 compares results from the probability analysis with the actual shares of 
votes recorded during the presidential election. The probability forecasts for nine 
battleground states (Abuja FCT, Adamawa, Ekiti, Lagos, Nasarawa, Ogun, Ondo, Oyo 
and Plateau) were consistent with the final outcome of the election. The results in four 
states were inconsistent with our forecasts. This yields a 69% success rate. Given that 
the data used for the analysis was collected mid-way into the administration of 
Goodluck Jonathan (two years before the presidential election), it is fair to say that on 
balance the empirical forecast analysis performs creditably well. 
Conclusion 
This article summarised the techniques used to determine the main 
administrative territories that were expected to decide the winner of Nigeria’s 2015 
presidential election. The authors discovered that around 35% of all eligible voters were 
responsible for the determination of the outcome of the election. These 35% were 
situated in 13 battleground states. Essentially, the PDP needed to hold on to their 
majority in these states whilst the APC needed to overturn the dominance. The article 
also used a robust spatial data analytical approach to evaluate the strength of public 
anger against former President Goodluck Jonathan within these 13 battleground states. 
The authors discover that mid-way into his tenure, Goodluck Jonathan’s public approval 
ratings had plummeted significantly in many LGAs within these battleground states and 
he was already on the verge of losing majority in at least 10 of the states. He eventually 
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Table 1: Hierarchical Structure of the Nigerian Geodemographic System 
Supergroups Groups Subgroups 
1 – Green Towns 1.1 – Conventional Green Towns 1.1.1 | 1.1.2 | 1.1.3 
1.2 – Underprivileged Green Towns 1.2.1 | 1.2.2 
1.3 – Flourishing Green Towns 1.3.1 | 1.3.2 | 1.3.3 
1.4 – Struggling Green Towns 1.4.1 | 1.4.2 | 1.4.3 
2 – Emerging Localities 2.1 – Moderately Emerging Localities 2.1.1 | 2.1.2 | 2.1.3 
2.2 – Comfortable Emerging Localities 2.2.1 | 2.2.2 | 2.2.3 
2.3 – Transient Emerging Localities 2.3.1 | 2.3.2 | 2.3.3 
3 – Intermediate Territories 3.1 – Constrained Intermediate Territories 3.1.1 | 3.1.2 
3.2 – Well-to-do Intermediate Territories 3.2.1 | 3.2.2 | 3.2.3 
3.3 – Deprived Intermediate Territories 3.3.1 | 3.3.2 
3.4 – Customary Intermediate Territories 3.4.1 | 3.4.2 
4 – Diluted Societies 4.1 – Thriving Diluted Societies 4.1.1 | 4.1.2 
4.2 – Labouring Diluted Societies 4.2.1 | 4.2.2 | 4.2.3 
4.3 – Deprived Diluted Societies 4.3.1 | 4.3.2  
4.4 – Modest Diluted Societies 4.4.1 | 4.4.2 | 4.4.3 
5 – Country Dwellings  5.1 – Toiling Country Dwellings 5.1.1 | 5.1.2 
5.2 – Deprived Country Dwellings 5.2.1 | 5.2.2 
5.3 – Middle-class Country Dwellings 5.3.1 | 5.3.2 | 5.3.3 
6 – Urban Nodes 6.1 – Prosperous Urban Nodes 6.1.1 | 6.1.2 
6.2 – Disadvantaged Urban Nodes 6.2.1 | 6.2.2 
6.3 – Average Urban Nodes 6.3.1 | 6.3.2 
6.4 – Affluent Urban Nodes 6.4.1 | 6.4.2 | 6.4.3 








Table 2: States with Pervasive Multiple Voters Registration in 2011 
States Multiple Registration Rate (%) 
Sokoto State 14.1 
Yobe State 13.1 
Zamfara State 11.9 
Ondo State 10 
Cross River State 9.3 
Lagos State 9.3 
Abia State 9.1 
Plateau State 9.1 
Oyo State 8.8 
Adamawa State 8.6 
Gombe State 8.1 
Bayelsa State 7.8 
Jigawa State 7.2 
Imo State 6.6 
Nasarawa State 6.4 
Ekiti State 6.0 
Kano State 5.8 
 
Table 3: Key to Interpreting Propensity Indices 
Propensity Range of Propensity Index Scores 
Very High 200 and above 
High 151 to 199 
Moderately High 121 to 150 
Above Average 101 to 120 
National Average  100 
Below Average 71 to 99 
Moderately Low 51 to 70 
Low 21 to 50 
Very Low 20 and below 
 
Table 4: Probability Forecasts vs. Actual Outcome of Election 
Battleground 
States 
Forecasted Probability of Voting Against 
President Jonathan (%)  
Actual 
Outcome: 













































































Abuja 24 22 24  48 51 1 
Adamawa 50 62 51  59 40 1 
Benue 37 41 36  55 44 1 
Ekiti 46 41 48  40 59 1 
Kogi 18 12 18  63 36 2 
Kwara 42 71 41  69 30 1 
Lagos 70 69 69  55 44 1 
Nasarawa 38 50 29  46 53 1 
Ogun 72 71 74  58 39 3 
Ondo 52 45 52  53 45 2 
Oyo 51 60 57  60 34 6 
Plateau 11 14 20  44 56 0 
Taraba 53 57 58  45 54 1 
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